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HE subject of this Article deals with cases in which either the parties
or the event or transaction, or both, are connected with a foreign
jurisdiction. Within conflict of laws lie three interrelated areas of
study: jurisdiction, choice of law, and foreign judgments. Several Texas
cases were decided in both the areas of jurisdiction and choice of law during
the Survey period. There were no significant developments in the area of
foreign judgments.
I. JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Jurisdiction has been called "a coat of many colors," and within the con-
text of conflict of laws, it is a principal concern insofar as jurisdictional prin-
ciples have the effect of allocating judicial business among states and nations
or of determining whether another state's exercise of judicial power will be
respected.I Although the cases summarized in this section touch on both of
these issues, most concern the allocation of judicial business among states or
nations. The issue is addressed largely through a discussion of the factors
that must be present in a given transaction in order for a chosen forum to
have jurisdiction.
Four major questions must be considered in determining whether a case
may be brought in a particular court: (1) Has the court jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant or his property?; (2) Has the court jurisdiction over
the subject-matter?; (3) Has the suit been brought in a proper venue?; and
(4) Is there any statute or doctrine under which a court otherwise qualified
to proceed with the case may or must refuse to entertain it? For this review
of Texas law, the cases are grouped into those addressing whether or not the
court has jurisdiction in the matter, and those addressing doctrines, such as
forum non conveniens, which would cause an otherwise qualified court to
refuse to entertain jurisdiction.
A. Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
The basic rules which permit a court to exercise personal jurisdiction are
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well established and the subject of prior survey articles. 2 To summarize,
there are two conditions that must be met in order for a Texas court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. First, the appli-
cable long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction.3 Second,
the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process.4 These two requirements are generally the same regard-
less of whether one is dealing with a case in state court or a federal court
diversity case.
Under the long-arm statute component, it must be determined whether
the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts
with the forum state; that is, whether the nonresident defendant "purpose-
fully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."5 This pur-
poseful availment requirement ensures that a nonresident defendant will not
be haled into a jurisdiction based solely upon "random," "fortuitous" or
"attenuated" contacts or the "unilateral activity of another party or third
person. "6 In addition, individuals must have "fair warning that a particular
activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." 7
To determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent
with due process, the courts have long relied on the principles traditionally
followed by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of each
state's authority. In what has become the classic expression of the criterion,
the United States Supreme Court held in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,8 that a State court's assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due
Process Clause if it does not violate "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." 9
1. Texas Supreme Court
Perhaps the most important case decided during the Survey period was
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, R.L. C. 0
in which the Texas supreme court clarified the jurisdictional formula estab-
lished in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. I" and later modified in Schlobohm v.
Schapiro,'2 to ensure compliance with federal constitutional requirements of
due process. Guardian Royal is an English insurance company with its of-
fice and principal place of business in England. English China is an English
2. See, e.g., Sharon Freytag & Michelle McCoy, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of
Texas Law 5 Sw. L.J. 149, 150 (1991).
3. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990).
4. Id. at 356.
5. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
6. Id. at 475; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
7. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J. concurring).
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. Id. at 316.
10. 815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
11. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
12. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
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company with American subsidiaries, including Southern Clay and Gonza-
les Clay, which are Texas corporations. In 1980-81 Guardian Royal issued
an insurance policy including several endorsements to English China provid-
ing coverage for third party liability occurring anywhere English China and
its subsidiary companies did business. All transactions between Guardian
Royal and English China occurred in England.
Guardian Royal understood that the coverage was extended to the Ameri-
can subsidiaries, and that each subsidiary was to obtain underlying liability
insurance from American insurers. Southern Clay and Gonzales Clay were
two such subsidiaries. Southern Clay acquired liability coverage from
United States Fire Insurance Company (U.S. Fire) and others. Although
these two subsidiaries were listed in a policy endorsement as being located in
the United States, there was no indication that they were located in Texas.
Guardian Royal claimed that it did not know whether English China or its
American subsidiaries did business in Texas or sent products to Texas.
In 1982 an employee of Southern Clay was killed in an on-the-job accident
in Gonzales County, Texas. The decedent's family filed wrongful death law-
suits against the English China entities and others in federal and state courts
in Texas. The English China entities settled the lawsuits and U.S. Fire con-
tributed to the settlement. Guardian Royal declined to contribute to these
settlements, as it claimed that its policy covered English China and its sub-
sidiaries only for liability in excess of the coverage provided by American
insurers. U.S. Fire, as subrogee of the English China entities, claimed that it
was entitled to reimbursement for its settlement contribution from Guardian
Royal, because Guardian Royal was the primary insurer. Guardian Royal
refused, and U.S. Fire filed suit against Guardian Royal. Guardian Royal
specially appeared, claiming that the insurance agreement was strictly be-
tween two English companies and was negotiated and implemented in Eng-
land. Accordingly, Guardian Royal claimed it had insufficient contacts with
Texas, and the trial court dismissed the claim on the ground that Guardian
Royal negated every possible basis for personal jurisdiction.1 3
On appeal, the appellate court applied the O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. 14 three-
prong test to determine the constitutional reach of the court's jurisdiction
over defendants with only a single or few contacts with Texas.' 5 The court
of appeals noted that the insurer's agreement to cover accidents occurring
13. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 225.
14. O'Brien, 399 S.W.2d at 342. The test consists of the following three prongs: (1) the
nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate
some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from or be connected
with such act or transaction. Even if the cause of the action does not arise from a specific
contact, jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are continuous
and systematic; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality,
nature and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, and
the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and
basic equalities of the situation.
15. Southern Clay Products, Inc. v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd., 762
S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988), rev'd sub noma., Guardian Royal Ex-
change Assurance Ltd. v. English China Clays P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
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anywhere in the world included those occurring in Texas and indicated that
Guardian Royal intended to serve the Texas market.16 The court concluded
its jurisdictional analysis with a discussion of foreseeability and acceptance
of the risk of litigation in a particular forum. 17 The court stated that Guard-
ian Royal assumed the risk of accidents occurring in foreign jurisdictions
when they specifically agreed to cover U.S. subsidiaries. Therefore, Guard-
ian Royal had sufficient notice that a substantial subject of insurance was
regularly present in the United States and sufficient notice that it might be
brought into any court where a United States subsidiary was located and a
covered accident occurred.18
Guardian Royal argued that the Texas court's assertion of in personam
jurisdiction over Guardian Royal was inconsistent with federal constitu-
tional requirements of due process. The Texas supreme court agreed. The
state long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents doing business in Texas.' 9 Although it lists particular acts which con-
stitute "doing business," the statute also provides that the nonresident's
other acts may satisfy the "doing business" requirement. 20 The broad lan-
guage of the long-arm statute's "doing business" requirement permits the
statute to reach as far as the federal constitutional notion of due process will
allow. 2 1 As a result the court was able to consider the sole issue of whether
it was consistent with federal constitutional requirements of due process for
Texas courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over Guardian Royal. 22
Under the minimum contacts analysis, the court had to determine
whether the nonresident defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.23 The court noted that "the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is proper when the contacts proximately result from
actions of the nonresident defendant which create a substantial connection
with the forum state."'24 The substantial connection between the nonresi-
dent defendant and the forum state necessary for a finding of minimum con-
tacts must come about by action or conduct of the nonresident defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum state.25 However, "the constitu-
tional touchstone remains whether the [nonresident] defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts in the forum State."'26
The Texas supreme court recognized that the jurisdictional formula may
be reviewed and modified to ensure compliance with federal constitutional
16. Id. at 931.
17. Id. at 932.
18. Id.
19. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
20. Id.; Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
21. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357; U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760,
762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
22. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 226. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413-14.
23. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75.
24. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 226. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75.
25. Id. at 472-76.
26. Id. at 474.
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requirements of due process. 27 In clarifying and refining the jurisdictional
formula articulated in O'Brien and Schlobohm, the Texas supreme court
stated that, first, the nonresident defendant must have purposefully estab-
lished minimum contacts with Texas. 28 There must be a substantial connec-
tion between the nonresident defendant and Texas arising from action or
conduct of the nonresident defendant purposefully directed toward Texas.
When specific jurisdiction is asserted, the cause of action must arise out of or
relate to the nonresident defendant's contacts with Texas. There must be
continuous and systematic contacts between the nonresident defendant and
Texas, when general jurisdiction is alleged. In addition, general jurisdiction
requires a showing of substantial activities by the nonresident defendant in
Texas. 29
Second, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with fair play
and substantial justice. This inquiry requires the defendant to "present a
compelling case that the presence of some other consideration would render
jurisdiction unreasonable."' 30 The Texas supreme court determined that the
stringent standard to be applied is set forth in Burger King.3 1
In applying the jurisdictional formula to a particular case, the facts must
be carefully weighed, and mechanical application of any test, including the
Texas formula, must be avoided. 32 In addition, the Texas supreme court
stated that Texas courts should strive to utilize a realistic approach when
applying the jurisdictional formula. 33
After applying this formula, the Texas supreme court determined that
Guardian Royal had established minimum contacts with Texas. As the in-
surer of English China and approximately 120 subsidiaries located in many
countries including the United States, and the issuer of an insurance policy
providing coverage for third party liability occurring anywhere English
China and its subsidiary companies did business, Guardian Royal could rea-
sonably anticipate the significant risk that a subsidiary would become in-
volved in disputes and litigation in many places, including any state in the
United States. Accordingly, the court found that Guardian Royal had pur-
posefully established minimum contacts with Texas.
The court, however, concluded that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
27. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 230. The Texas supreme court recently acknowledged
the necessity to review the jurisdictional formula, and, in Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358,
modified the second part of the formula to include the concept of general jurisdiction.
28. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 230.
29. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
30. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
31. Enlgish China, 815 S.W.2d at 231. The following factors, when appropriate, should
be considered: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudi-
cating the dispute (including the state's special regulatory interest in areas such as insurance);
(3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared
interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King,
471 U.S. at 477-78. See also Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
32. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 231.
33. Id. See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358. The jurisdictional formula is a useful jurisdic-
tional checklist which ensures that all aspects of the necessary analysis have been considered.
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over Guardian Royal did not comport with notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice and was, hence, unreasonable. 34 Requiring Guardian Royal, an
English insurer unaffiliated with American companies, to submit its dispute
with its English insured to a foreign nation's judicial system was burden-
some. Frequently the interests of the forum state and the plaintiff justify the
severe burden placed upon the nonresident defendant. In English China,
however, the interests of Texas in adjudicating the dispute and the English
China entities in obtaining convenient and effective relief were minimal.
The court continued that Texas has an interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims,
and these residents would be disadvantaged if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant state in order to litigate. 35 However, in this
case, the dispute was between two insurers - Guardian Royal and U.S.
Fire. The family of the deceased employee had already received compensa-
tion in settlement of their suit. U.S. Fire was the real party in interest as
subrogee to the English China entities. Neither Guardian Royal nor U.S.
Fire were Texas consumers or insureds; thus, Texas' interest in adjudicating
the dispute (including the special interest of regulating insurance) was con-
siderably diminished. Texas does not have a compelling interest in provid-
ing a forum for resolution of disputes between the two insurers. Thus, the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Guardian Royal was unreasonable
and did not comport with fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the
Texas supreme court held that it was inconsistent with federal constitutional
requirements of due process for a Texas court to assert in personam jurisdic-
tion over Guardian Royal and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
Justice Mauzy dissented in the case, contending that the pertinent inquiry
was whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Guardian Royal would be
haled into court in Texas. Justice Mauzy claimed that an insurer should
foresee being sued in any jurisdiction in which its insured has substantial
contacts. 36 Such was the case here, as Guardian Royal specifically extended
coverage to English China's Texas subsidiaries and specifically deleted the
policy's geographical limits.
In response to the question of whether the exercise of in personam juris-
diction was reasonable, Justice Mauzy discounted the fact that the real party
in interest was U.S. Fire. He contended that the result should be no differ-
ent, as Texas has an interest in encouraging subrogation since it facilitates
recovery of injured plaintiffs and functions to distribute the incidence of loss
in accordance with responsibility for the loss. 37
34. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 232-33.
35. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 232-33 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
36. Id. at 233 (citing Eli Lilly and Co. v. Home Ins., 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987)).
37. English China, 815 S.W.2d at 234 (Manzy, J., dissenting).
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2. Recent Decisions in Texas State Appellate Courts
In Bissbort v. Wright Printing & Publishing Co. 38 a Texas appellate court
held that a defendant who conducted business in Texas via the mails had
satisfied the purposeful act requirement, thus making the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by Texas courts consistent with fair play and substantial justice. Biss-
bort sued Wright for breach of a written contract to repair a printing press
belonging to Wright. The parties stipulated that Wright was an Iowa corpo-
ration, Bissbort was a resident of Texas, and each party signed the contract
at its office. Wright's foreman initially telephoned Bissbort inquiring if Biss-
bort would be interested in purchasing a surplus press from Wright and re-
pairing the press described in the contract. Bissbort later went to Des
Moines to discuss the transactions with Wright and, after returning to
Texas, mailed Wright a proposal describing the repairs to be performed, his
charge for the services, and the terms of the payment. After Wright ac-
cepted his proposal Bissbort prepared and mailed the contract to Wright.
Wright returned the signed contract to Bissbort and wired part of the con-
tract price. Bissbort returned to Des Moines, disassembled the press, and
transported the parts to Texas to be prepared. Bissbort sued Wright for
breach of the contract alleging Wright had failed to pay the entire contract
price for Bissbort's services. Wright filed a special appearance and chal-
lenged the trial court's jurisdiction over it by claiming that it had insufficient
contacts with the State of Texas. The trial court agreed and entered an order
sustaining Wright's special appearance and dismissing the suit. The appel-
late court reversed, stating that, under the Texas long-arm statute, "one is
doing business within the state if he contracts by mail with a Texas resident
and the contract is to be performed in whole or in part within the state."'3 9
Additionally, the appellate court applied the three-prong test adopted in
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. 4 to ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction complied
with federal constitutional standards. In doing so, it found that Wright pur-
posefully acted to consummate a transaction in Texas by initiating negotia-
tions with a telephone call to Bissbort, by executing a contract requiring it to
make payments in Texas and by wiring partial payment price to Bissbort's
bank account in Texas. Because Bissbort's cause of action arose from this
transaction, an exercise of jurisdiction met the second requirement of the
Texas formula. The third prong of the formula was the most difficult to
satisfy, because it required the court to determine whether, despite the exist-
ence of minimum contacts, there was reason why the assertion of jurisdiction
would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.4'
Although Wright's Texas contacts were limited, the court held that be-
cause of the qualities of those acts, particularly the act of wiring money to a
Texas bank, Wright had availed itself of the protection and remedies of the
Texas law and Texas courts. When Wright wired the money to Texas, it
38. 801 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
39. Id. at 589; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.042 (Vernon 1986).
40. 399 S.W.2d 340, 342. For discussion of the test, see supra note 14.
41. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 359.
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"took advantage of the protection from misappropriation provided by Texas
law and implicitly expressed confidence in Texas courts to provide a remedy
if misappropriation occurred."'42 Finally, the Court noted that Wright
would not be excessively burdened or inconvenienced by litigating in the
Texas court. Therefore, the court held that exercising jurisdiction over
Wright did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Another Texas appellate court reached a similar conclusion regarding the
defendant's contacts with Texas in Design Information Systems v. Feith Sys-
tems & Software, Inc. 43 In Feith Carl Wilson, d/b/a Design Information
Systems, had purchased computer software from Feith and instituted suit
alleging that the product was not satisfactory. Feith was served a citation
under the Texas long-arm statute,44 and filed a special appearance and objec-
tion to jurisdiction. The trial court sustained Feith's objection and dismissed
the suit. The appellate court reversed upon finding that Feith's contacts
with Texas were continuous and systematic enough to permit the imposition
of jurisdiction.
Feith was a Pennsylvania corporation that relied on national advertising
in trade publications and exhibited at trade shows to sell its products. It had
no offices, employees or representatives in Texas and did not engage in any
advertising or sales efforts especially directed toward prospective customers
in Texas. Feith's participation in trade shows and its national advertising
generated prospective customers who called or wrote Feith about purchases
of Feith's products.
Wilson became acquainted with Feith's products through a trade show in
Nevada or through another customer of Feith. He placed his order with
Feith by telephone and software was shipped to him in Texas. Feith wrote
to Wilson in Texas but all letters were written in response to inquiries made
by Wilson. Feith's president testified that at the time of Wilson's purchase
Feith had about ten customers in Texas and by the time of the hearing Feith
had about 25 customers in Texas. Feith's Texas customers constituted only
a small percentage of its nationwide sales.
To determine whether a Texas court could properly exercise jurisdiction
over Feith, the court applied the test set forth in O'Brien,45 and modified in
Schlobohm.46 Feith contended that the holding in C. W Brown Machine
Shop Inc. v. Stanley Machine Corp.,47 was dispositive of the issue before the
court, but the court disagreed. In C. W. Brown the nonresident defendant
was shown to have made only one isolated sale in Texas, whereas in Feith
the nonresident defendant was shown to have had 25 Texas customers. The
court found that repeated sales transactions with residents of the state satis-
fied the "continuing and systematic contacts" test enunciated by the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the court concluded that requiring Feith to
42. Bissbort, 801 S.W.2d at 589.
43. 801 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1990, no writ).
44. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
45. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
46. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990). See supra note 14 discussing the three prong test.
47. 670 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1984, no writ).
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submit to the jurisdiction of Texas courts did not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.48
The case of Lujan v. Sun Exploration & Production Company 49 presents a
third example of the application of Texas' long-arm statute. Lujan appealed
from an order sustaining a challenge to personal jurisdiction in favor of
Chaparral Services. In her sole point of error, Lujan contended that the trial
court erred in sustaining the challenge to jurisdiction because Chaparral had
been shown by the evidence to have systematic and continuous contacts with
the state of Texas and had taken purposeful steps to submit itself to the
jurisdiction of Texas courts. The appellate court reversed the judgment of
the trial court.
Plaintiff's husband, a New Mexico resident and employee of Chaparral, a
New Mexico corporation, was killed in an explosion at an oil tank storage
facility located in Eunice, New Mexico. At the time of his death, the dece-
dent was performing work under a contract between Chaparral and Sun Ex-
ploration & Production Company ("Sun"), a Delaware corporation with
offices in Midland, Texas and Hobbs, New Mexico. Lujan, the decedent's
wife, brought a wrongful death action against Sun and Chaparral in Dallas
County, Texas alleging negligence on the part of Sun and gross negligence
on the part of Chaparral. Chaparral filed a special appearance contesting the
court's jurisdiction. The appellate court agreed with Lujan's contention that
Chaparral's business contacts in Texas constituted both sufficient minimum
contacts and a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of Texas laws.50
Texas law requires that jurisdiction over a nonresident be authorized
under the Texas long-arm statutes ' and consistent with federal and state
constitutional guarantees of due process.5 2 The Texas long-arm statute ex-
pressly authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over those who do business in
the state.5 3
Chaparral had entered into a contract in Texas with Sun to perform oil
field service work. During the contract period Chaparral and Sun made sev-
eral contacts by mail. Chaparral also sent his employees into Texas to ob-
tain supplies and to perform occasional work under contracts with Texas-
based companies. The court concluded that Chaparral's contacts with
Texas, as a result of this business relationship with Sun, constituted doing
48. Feith, 801 S.W.2d at 571.
49. 798 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
50. Id. at 829.
51. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
52. § 17.069 (Vernon 1986).
53. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986). Section 17.042 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code pro-
vides that:
In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does
business in this state if the nonresident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with
a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part
in these state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits
Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for
employment inside or outside this state.
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business under section 17.042.54 Thus, the court found the requirement for
jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute had been met. The court went
on to determine that the exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with the fed-
eral and state constitutional guarantees of due process. The Texas supreme
court has held that the broad language of section 17.042 allows the long-arm
statute to reach as far as the federal constitution permits.5"
A primary goal of the due process test is to protect the defendant.5 6 Thus,
all three prongs of the Schlobohm test must be met to support jurisdiction.
The Texas supreme court rejected the mechanical application of any test,
including the Schlobohm formula, regarding instead, the Schlobohm formula
as a useful jurisdictional checklist which helps insure consideration of all
aspects of the necessary analysis.57 The first prong of the Schlobohm test
concerns the "minimum contacts" analysis.58 This analysis is somewhat
narrow, focusing on the relationship between the defendant, the forum and
the litigation.59 In Schlobohm the court noted that, to establish minimum
contacts, the foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consum-
mate some transaction in the foreign state.c° The act must be purposefully
directed into Texas, regardless of the volume. 61 Moreover, the activity must
justify a conclusion that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being
called into court there.62
Chaparral's manager testified that it operated an oil field service company,
"hauling water, cleaning tanks, [and doing] hot [sic] oil well and roustabout
connection work" for drillers and producers. 63 Business was obtained by
getting on the approval list of oil companies. To do this Chaparral supplied
a certificate of insurance and price list for its services to its prospects. Con-
tracts would then be entered into by mailing them to the office designated by
the oil company. For example, contracts with Sun Production and Exxon
were signed by Chaparral and mailed to the Texas offices for acceptance.
In 1979, Chaparral entered into a contract with Sun to provide oil field
services on an "as needed basis." No service was rendered in Texas by
Chaparral for Sun during this time. Chaparral maintained both liability and
workers compensation insurance coverage in Texas, as well as a commercial
umbrella liability policy with Employers of Texas, from the inception of its
contract with Sun in 1979. In 1986, Chaparral entered into a contract to
perform oil field services for Oxy USA. Services under this contract were
rendered in Texas by Chaparral during the period of the Sun contract. Fur-
54. Lujan, 798 S.W.2d at 830.
55. See U-Anchor Advertising, 553 S.W.2d at 762.
56. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
57. See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
58. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316;
Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
59. See Helicopteros 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
60. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
61. Id. at 359.
62. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 299; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
250-52 (1958).
63. Lujan, 798 S.W.2d at 831.
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thermore, Chaparral carried advertising during the past ten years for its ser-
vice in a trade publication distributed throughout the Permian Basin,
including both Texas and New Mexico. Furthermore, evidence revealed
that Chaparral employees traveled in Texas on a regular basis. The court
found this sufficient evidence to establish minimum contacts between Chap-
arral and Texas, satisfying the first prong of the Schlobohm formula.
The second prong of the Schlobohm test focuses on the distinction be-
tween specific and general jurisdiction. Prior to Schlobohm, the second
prong of the due process test provided only that "the cause of action must
arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction." 64 In Schlobohm,
the court modified the second prong of the test, adding that "jurisdiction
may be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are continuing and
systematic." 65 In adopting this modification it was the court's intention to
clarify the federal and state cases which stand for the proposition that juris-
diction is possible whether there are single or numerous contacts between
the forum and the defendant.66
Where the activities of the defendant in the forum are isolated or dis-
jointed, jurisdiction is said to be specific, and is proper if the cause of action
arises from a particular activity.67 Where the defendant's activities in the
form are continuous and systematic, however, jurisdiction is said to be gen-
eral, and may be proper without a relationship between the defendant's par-
ticular act in the cause of action. 68 The minimum contacts inquiry is
broader and more demanding when general jurisdiction is alleged, requiring
a showing of substantial activities in the forum state.69
In Lujan, Chaparral was not authorized to do business in Texas, had no
agent in Texas for service of process, had no employees based in Texas, kept
no records in Texas and owned no real or personal property in Texas. None-
theless, Chaparral entered into a long term contract with Sun in Texas to
perform work for it and performed work in West Texas for others and made
occasional trips to Texas to purchase supplies. Chaparral carried insurance
coverage to protect its employees while working in Texas, and to provide
continuing protection to Chaparral in the event that work was done or it
should be sued in Texas. Chaparral also advertised its services in a publica-
tion distributed in Texas. The court found that the advertisement clearly
constituted a solicitation of business in Texas. 70
The cause of action in Lujan did not arise from and was not connected
with Chaparral's contacts in Texas. Rather it was based on allegations of
wrongful death and gross negligence occurring in New Mexico. Therefore
specific jurisdiction was not established. The court concluded, however, that
general jurisdiction had been established, based on the contacts between Sun
64. O'Brien, 399 S.W.2d at 342.
65. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
66. See id. at 359; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15.
67. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417 n.8; Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
68. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357; see Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9.
69. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
70. Lujan, 798 S.W.2d at 832.
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and Chaparral and Chaparral's other continuing business operations in
Texas. 7' In sum, one of the factors supporting general jurisdiction was evi-
dence of prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences. The ex-
press terms of the contract between Sun and Chaparral provided that Texas
courts would have the jurisdiction over litigation resulting from the execu-
tion of the contract. 72 The court concluded that these factors represented
continuing and systematic contacts with Texas.
The third prong of the Schlobohm formula focuses on the equitable ques-
tions regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 73 Ex-
ercising jurisdiction must not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 74 In Lujan the court concluded that the third prong of
the Schlobohm formula was satisfied. While Chaparral is a foreign corpora-
tion primarily operating in New Mexico and hiring New Mexico residents,
its contract with Sun was broad and substantial. The court noted that the
convenience of allowing Lujan to bring a single suit against Sun and Chapar-
ral jointly in a Texas court is an important factor. The court concluded that
Chaparral could and indeed did reasonably anticipate being brought before
Texas courts to defend itself in litigation stemming from its contract with
Sun, and that exercising jurisdiction over Chaparral in Texas would not of-
fend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.75
In G&R Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. The Natural Choice, Inc. 76 the appellant
challenged an effort to enforce a default judgment rendered in New Mexico
against the appellant, claiming that the New Mexico court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the appellant, thus rendering the New Mexico judgment unen-
forceable in Texas courts. If a foreign judgment is filed with the clerk of a
court of competent jurisdiction in this state, it is entitled to the same effect as
a Texas judgment. 77 However, the foreign judgment is also subject to the
same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating and stay-
ing as the judgment of the Texas court.78
A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a court rendering the for-
eign judgment by asserting that the court's exercise of jurisdiction did not
meet the requirements of that state's long-arm statute and due process of
law.79 Unless extrinsic evidence of the record establishes that the foreign
court did not have jurisdiction, a Texas court will presume it did.80 The
71. Id. at 833.
72. See Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
73. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 359.
74. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 320.
75. Lujan, 798 S.W.2d at 833.
76. 811 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
77. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon 1986).
78. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(c) (Vernon 1986).
79. Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Sparks, 782 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1989, no writ); Hill Country Spring Water v. Krug, 773 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, writ denied); Moody v. First National Bank, 530 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. Abramowitz v. Miller, 649 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ); Colson
v. Thunderbird Building Materials, 589 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ
ref'd. n.r.e.); Moody, 530 S.W.2d at 881.
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presumption must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the
foreign court lacked jurisdiction.8 Along with the fairness standard, the
forum state's interest must be considered.82 The state has a great interest in
providing a forum for its citizens where the cost relating to production of
evidence and witnesses are considered. 83 The state also has an interest in
providing a convenient forum in which disputes involving its citizens can be
resolved.8 4
Under the New Mexico long-arm statute, a New Mexico court has juris-
diction over a non-resident corporation if the corporation transacts any busi-
ness within the state.8 5 New Mexico courts have equated "transaction of
any business" required by the long-arm statute with sufficient minimum con-
tacts required by due process.8
6
In G&R Gourmet Foods the evidence indicated that the appellant did not
transact business in New Mexico. The appellant negotiated with a represen-
tative in Houston to buy the appellee's products; the appellant placed orders
for the appellee's products with the representative in Houston; and the ap-
pellant received the appellee's products in Houston. The appellant did not
go to New Mexico to pick up the appellee's products, nor did it send any
agents to New Mexico.8 7 The only contact that appellant had with New
Mexico was sending six checks and one letter to the appellee in New Mex-
ico.88 These contacts were not sufficient to bring the appellant within the
reach of New Mexico's long-arm statute.8 9 Therefore, the New Mexico
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellant, and the foreign judg-
ment was unenforceable.
81. Escalona v. Combs, 712 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no
writ).
82. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
83. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
84. Id. at 223.
85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (Michie 1978).
86. Valley Wide Health Serv., Inc. v. Graham, 738 P.2d 1316 (1987); Diamond A Cattle
Company v. Broadbent, 505 P.2d 64 (1973).
87. Compare McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 466 P.2d 868 (1970) (appellant who initiated
purchase of products in New Mexico, negotiated deal in New Mexico, and came to New Mex-
ico to pick up product, transacted business in the state).
88. See Salas v. Homestake Enterprises, Inc., 742 P.2d 1049 (1987) (defendant is not sub-
ject to suit in New Mexico where his only contact with New Mexico was mailing two docu-
ments and making a telephone call into the state); Diamond A, 505 P.2d at 65, (defendant is
not subject to judgment in personam on basis that three payments mailed into the state); cf.
Tarango v. Pastrana, 616 P.2d 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (defendants were not subject to in
personam jurisdiction on basis of statements for payments for services rendered in Texas and
mailed to plaintiffs in New Mexico).
89. See Wesley v. H & D Wireless Ltd., Partnership, 678 F. Supp. 1540, 1542 (D.N.M.
1987) (under New Mexico law, defendants were not subject to jurisdiction in New Mexico
courts when defendants merely responded, my mail and by telephone, to plaintiff's solicita-
tions for business in another state and subsequently purchased a product from plaintiffs); Cus-
tomwood Mfg., Inc. v. Downey Constr. Co., 691 P.2d 57 (1984) (defendant's contacts with
New Mexico were insufficient to constitute transaction to do business within the state when he
placed an order with the plaintiff, as had previously been arranged by the plaintiff and a third




In Security Pacific Corporation v. Lupo 90 Security Pacific's basic claim in
challenging a default judgment was that the trial court did not acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction because Lupo failed to comply strictly with the require-
ments of the Texas long-arm statute. Lupo had brought suit against Security
Pacific on an alleged usurious demand made upon him by a collection ser-
vice. He alleged that the original loan was made by Mariner Corporation, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Security Pacific, that the collection service was
acting as agent for Security Pacific in making the usurious demand, and that
Security Pacific was a nonresident California corporation doing business in
Texas that neither maintained a regular place of business nor had a desig-
nated agent for service of process in Texas. The allegations in Lupo's peti-
tion were sufficient to authorize substituted service upon the Secretary of
State pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.91
Lupo twice attempted to serve a citation upon Security Pacific, the certifi-
cate being returned with a signature of the addressee's agent. Security Pa-
cific did not file an answer and the trial court entered a default judgment in
favor of Lupo. Security Pacific claimed that the attempted service was inef-
fective because the record established that Lupo failed to comply strictly
with the requirements of section 17.045(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.92 The court agreed. "In order to show jurisdiction neces-
sary to support a default judgment when service under a long-arm statute is
used, [Lupo] must allege facts which, if true, would make [Security Pacific]
amenable to process by the use of the long-arm statute; and second, there
must be proof in the record that [Security Pacific] was, in fact, served in the
manner required by the statute."' 93 Lupo satisfied the first prong of the test,
but failed the second.
Citing Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation,94 the court
noted that because the long-arm statute authorized substituted service, its
provisions must be strictly followed. Section 17.045(a) of the Texas Civil
Practices & Remedies Code provides that: "[i]f the secretary of state is
served with duplicate copies of process for a nonresident, he shall require the
statement of the name and address of the nonresident's home or home office
and shall immediately mail a copy of the process to the nonresident." 95 This
provision clearly contemplates that process be mailed to the home office ad-
dress of the non-resident. The court found that there was nothing in the
record that would indicate that Security Pacific's address, as listed in the
petition, was Security Pacific's home office address, or that there was a Se-
curity Pacific office located at that address. Therefore, the court determined
that the record failed to affirmatively show that Lupo strictly complied with
the provisions of section 17.045(a) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies
90. 808 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
91. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044(b) (Vernon 1986).
92. Id. § 17.045(a).
93. Security Pacific, 808 S.W.2d at 127.
94. 642 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
95. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(a) (Vernon 1986).
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Code. Because the trial court did not acquire in personam jurisdiction over
Security Pacific, the default judgment was set aside.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine used by
courts to resist imposition of an inconvenient jurisdiction on a litigant, even
if jurisdiction is supported by the long-arm statute and would not otherwise
violate due process. A trial court can use the doctrine when it determines
that for the convenience of the litigants and witnesses and in the interest of
justice the action should be instituted in another forum.96 In determining
whether to dismiss a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the
trial court must weigh a number of factors. These factors have been detailed
previously in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 97 and Texas courts have adopted the
Gilbert factors. 98
Factors to be considered are the private interests of the litigants, the rela-
tive ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining attendance
from willing witnesses.99 Other factors, known as "public factors," include
the burden imposed upon the citizens of the state, the burden on the trial
court, and the general interest in having localized controversies decided in
the jurisdiction in which they arose. 100 Another consideration is whether a
judgment obtained in this jurisdiction will be enforceable.101 The Gilbert
court concluded that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defend-
ant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."'1
0 2
The doctrine of forum non conveniens presumes that at least two forums
are available to the plaintiff to pursue the claim.103 A trial court must first
determine that an available and alternative forum exists. This is a two part
inquiry: availability and adequacy. 104 A foreign forum is available when the
entire case and all the parties can come within the jurisdiction of that fo-
rum. 0 5 A foreign forum is adequate when the parties will not be deprived of
all remedies or treated unfairly. An exception to the general rule that the
defendant bears the burden on all elements of the forum non conveniens
analysis is that once the defendant establishes that an available forum exists,
96. See Van Winkle-Hooker Co. v. Rice, 448 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1969, no writ).
97. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
98. See generally McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985, writ dism'd); see also Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968, writ dism'd); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 341 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ dism'd).
99. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
100. Id. at 508-09.
101. Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. 1962).
102. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
103. Van Winkle-Hooker, 448 S.W.2d at 826.





the plaintiff must prove that the available forum is not adequate. 06
1. Legislative Response to the Alfaro Decision
The last Survey Article reported on the decision of the Texas supreme
court in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro. 10 7 The court ruled that section
71.031 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code abolished forum non
conveniens in cases involving personal injury and wrongful death.108 The
Alfaro decision has been severely criticized and, as a result, significant efforts
were made in the last legislative session to overrule the decision.
Bills were introduced in the House of Representatives (by Representatives
Culberson and McCollough) 109 and in the Senate (by Senator Montford), 10
with the stated purpose to overrule Alfaro. Although the original House and
Senate Bills were substantially the same, committee substitutes in the House
would have limited the impact of the legislation. None of the Bills were
passed.
2. Relevant Decisions
One important forum non conveniens decision during the Survey period
was Sarieddine v. Moussa.I1I In that case, Sarieddine sued to recover on a
note on which Moussa had defaulted. The sole point of error on appeal was
that the trial court had erred in dismissing the case under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. Moussa, a Lebanese citizen residing in Bahrain,
agreed to purchase all of Sarieddine's stock in a particular Luxembourg cor-
poration. Sarieddine was a Lebanese citizen residing in a suburb of Seattle,
Washington. Moussa defaulted under the payment agreements, including
the agreement at issue in the case. This agreement was negotiated from Seat-
tle and Bahrain, respectively, and contained a forum selection clause which
allowed for suit to be brought in any jurisdiction in which any assets or
property belonging to Moussa were located.
Sarieddine filed suit in Dallas to recover the amount of money still owed
by Moussa under the agreement, and Moussa was personally served in Dal-
las. However, the trial court dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. Sarieddine asserted that the forum selection clause pre-
cluded Moussa from asserting forum non conveniens, and the court noted
that, although Sarieddine cited no Texas authority in support of his conten-
tion, and the court on its own found none on point, federal case law dictated
that a trial court is not bound by the forum selection clause agreement if the
106. Vaz Borralho v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379, 393-94 (5th Cir. 1983). Justice Gonzalez,
in his dissent in Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 695 (Tex.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 671 (1990), suggested a standard similar to that adopted in Moussa: that an alternative
forum should be more than one where the defendant is amenable to process.
107. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1990).
108. Id. at 679.
109. Tex. H.B. 8, 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991).
110. Tex. S.B. 790, 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991).
111. No. 05-90-01035-CV, 1991 LEXIS 3138 (Tex. App. -Dallas Oct. 2, 1991). This case
has not been released for publication in the permanent law reports. Until released, it is subject
to revision or withdrawal.
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interests of the witness and of the public strongly favored transferring the
case to another forum.'1 2 While the forum selection clause might confer
personal jurisdiction, the court found that it did not preclude consideration
of a motion to dismiss on the theory of forum non conveniens. Thus, the
court decided that it would consider the forum selection clause only as a
factor in determining whether the trial court erred by dismissing the case
under forum non conveniens.
The court noted that before a court may invoke forum non conveniens,
the court must find that it has jurisdiction over the defendant." 3 Moussa
was personally served in Dallas, and he acknowledged that the trial court
had jurisdiction over him due to the holding in the United States Supreme
Court case, Burnham v. Superior Court of California.14 Because Moussa
conceded jurisdiction, the court did not find it necessary to determine
whether Moussa maintained minimum contacts with Texas or whether his
activities were "continuous or systematic" so that the exercise of general
jurisdiction over Moussa would not offend traditional notions of "fair play
and substantial justice." ' 15
The first question addressed by the Moussa court was whether Texas still
recognizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens in light of the recent Texas
supreme court holding in Alfaro." 6 The court in Alfaro ruled that section
71.031 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code abolished forum non con-
veniens in cases involving personal injury and wrongful death." 7 Sarieddine
asserted that Alfaro had abolished forum non conveniens in all cases or, al-
ternatively, that section 17.042 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code and Rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have abolished
forum non conveniens in Texas.
Alfaro is strictly limited to personal injury and wrongful death suits filed
under section 71.031 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Section
17.042, the long-arm statute, as well as sections 17.043 and 17.044, address
the extent of personal jurisdiction granted to Texas courts by outlining who
can be served. "8 There is no mandatory language in these statutes to justify
holding that they abolish forum non conveniens. The statutes merely outline
over whom Texas courts can acquire personal jurisdiction. While a trial
court may be required to find jurisdiction over the defendant, there is no
language in the statutes prohibiting the trial court from dismissing the case
under a theory of forum non conveniens."1 9 Thus, the appellate court found
112. See Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 758 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1973).
113. McNutt, 693 S.W.2d at 668.
114. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (jurisdiction based on physical presence alone satisfies due
process).
115. McNutt, 693 S.W.2d at 668.
116. 786 S.W.2d 674.
117. Id. at 679.
118. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.042, .043, .044 (Vernon 1986). Sections
17.043 and 17.044 provide only for service of process.
119. See Sarieddine, 1991 WL 255133 at 3. The court also noted that there was no lan-
guage in Rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which prohibits a trial court from
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that there was no basis for the assertion that Texas has abolished forum non
conveniens for all cases.
Applying the two-part "availability and adequacy" test to Moussa, that
court first determined whether there was evidence that any single available
forum existed where all the defendants were amenable to process. 120 It held
that Lebanon was available as a forum because both parties were citizens of
Lebanon. Abu-Dhabi was also an available forum because Moussa had con-
sented to jurisdiction there. 121 Bahrain was also an available forum since
Moussa resided in Bahrain.
Having determined that three forums were available, the court determined
whether they were also adequate. The court determined that Sarieddine had
not established the inadequacy of any of the available forums; therefore, the
court presumed that all of the available forums were adequate and qualified
as alternative forums. The court then went on to weigh the other factors to
determine whether the balance so strongly favored Moussa that Sarieddine's
choice of forum should be disturbed. 122 The determination of whether a
forum is convenient rests upon several private and public factors that the
United States Supreme Court stated should be considered and balanced by a
court when presented with a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
"[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." 123 The burden of establishing
that the balance strongly favors dismissal lies necessarily with the defendant.
Weighing the various factors, the court determined that Moussa had not met
this burden.
In Quintero v. Klaveness Shiplines 124 the Fifth Circuit determined, among
other things, that dismissal of an action based on forum non conveniens was
not required to be a dismissal without prejudice. A Filipino sailor was in-
jured while unloading a Liberian-registered, Norwegian-owned ship docked
in New Orleans. The sailor filed suit in federal district court in Louisiana,
and brought a parallel suit in Louisiana state court. The federal court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice for forum non con-
veniens. As part of its forum non conveniens analysis, the district court de-
termined that Philippine law should govern the controversy. Based on this
determination, and despite the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act,' 25 the
district court granted the defendant's request for an injunction preventing
dismissing a case on a theory of forum non conveniens once the defendant has "appeared and
answered."
120. Air Crash, 821 F.2d at 1165.
121. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (defendant is amenable to process for
purposes of forum non conveniens analysis where the defendant has agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of a foreign country).
122. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
123. Id.
124. 914 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1990).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). The Klaveness court noted, in dicta, that the United States
Supreme Court has noted that the re-litigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act allows a
federal court to enjoin state court re-litigation of a federal choice-of-law determination made
pursuant to a forum non conveniens dismissal.
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the plaintiff from re-litigating the choice-of-law issue pending in the Louisi-
ana state court proceeding.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the district court erred in dis-
missing the complaint with prejudice. Inter alia, he argued that the nature
of a forum non conveniens dismissal requires special deference and should
not be granted with prejudice. However, the court disagreed. The United
States Supreme Court had expressly approved a district court's ability to
enjoin relitigation of a choice of law determination made pursuant to a fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal. 126 The use of the injunction was premised on
an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that was intended to give preclusive
effect to the judgments of federal courts. Given that a district court can give
its choice of law determinations in forum non conveniens dismissals preclu-
sive effect by issuing an injunction, forum non conveniens dismissals can be
given preclusive effect by designating them as "with prejudice," so long as
the plaintiff's ability to reinstate the action is otherwise adequately
protected.
The court recognized that the plaintiff, in substance, was seeking the right
to refile the action and relitigate the choice of law determination in another,
more sympathetic forum. Thus, by dismissing with prejudice, the district
court effectively enjoined any refiling and later litigation. A forum non con-
veniens dismissal with prejudice had the same effect in Klaveness as an in-
junction against any relitigation of the district court's choice of law
determination. Therefore, the court concluded that nothing about a forum
non conveniens dismissal requires a dismissal without prejudice.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
In recent years, most states have moved away from the old rigid choice of
law rules - easily applied, but often unfair - to the newer rules based on
balancing competing interests. Texas has chosen to apply the "most signifi-
cant relationship test" in addressing choice of law problems in tort actions,
the substance of which is set forth in section 6 of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws. 127
However, in contract actions, courts have adopted a rule of limited party
autonomy, whereby parties may express in their agreements their own
choice that the law of a particular jurisdiction apply to their agreement.
This choice is limited only by the relationship of the parties or agreement to
the chosen jurisdiction, and the public policy of the chosen jurisdiction. 128
126. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1988).
127. See generally Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1585 (1985). In the article, Professor Hill argued that judges are intentionally fashioning ad
hoc choice-of-law models and rejecting the standard approaches such as the most-significant-
relationship test. However, this did not appear to be the case in Texas. The problem with
Texas choice-of-law decisions is more likely the result of hasty applications of the most-signifi-
cant-relationship test, stemming from a lack of familiarity with the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and with United States Supreme Court opinions on choice of law.
128. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990).
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Judicial respect for the parties' choice within these boundaries advances the
policy of protecting their expectations.
A. Choice of Law in Contract Actions
1. United States Supreme Court
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute 129 the United States Supreme
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a non-negotiated forum
selection clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable simply because
it is not the subject of bargaining. A husband and wife residing in the state
of Washington purchased tickets for a cruise between Los Angeles and Pu-
erto Vallarta on a ship operated by a Panamanian corporation which had its
principal place of business in Miami, Florida. There was a forum selection
clause in the ticket contract, although it was questionable that the Shute's
either read or should have read the clause. The clause designated courts
located in the state of Florida as the agreed-upon exclusive venue for litigat-
ing any disputes arising under the contract between passenger and carrier.
While the cruise ship was in international waters off the coast of Mexico,
the wife fell and was injured. The couple, claiming that the wife's injuries
had been caused by the negligence of the cruise line and its employees, filed
suit against the corporation in federal district court in Washington. The
corporation moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the corpora-
tion's contacts with the state of Washington were insufficient to support the
district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation. The
district court found in favor of the plaintiffs.1 30 However, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that the corporation had insufficient con-
tacts with the state to support personal jurisdiction.13 1 Thus, it would be
unreasonable to apply the forum-selection clause of the ticket contract be-
cause the clause was not freely bargained for, and there was evidence in the
record to indicate that the couple was physically and financially incapable of
pursuing litigation in Florida. 132
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forum-selec-
tion clause was enforceable.' 3 3 The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit
seemed to have distorted the Court's previous holding in MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 134 In evaluating the reasonableness of the forum
clause at issue, the Court refined the analysis of MIS Bremen to account for
the realities of forum passage contracts. 135 The Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's decision that a non-negotiated forum-selection clause in a form
ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the subject of
129. 1II S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
130. Id.
131. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
1522 (1991).
132. Id.
133. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
134. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
135. 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
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bargaining. 136 The Court recognized that a reasonable forum selection
clause in a form contract of this kind may be permissible for several rea-
sons. 137 First, the cruise line had a special interest in limiting the forum in
which it potentially could be subject to suit.138 Additionally, establishing ex
ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling any
confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and
defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pre-trial motions to de-
termine the correct forum, and conserving judicial resources that would
otherwise be devoted to deciding those motions.
139
The Ninth Circuit's independent justification that the clause should not be
enforced because the evidence suggested that the Shutes were not physically
and financially capable of pursuing this litigation in Florida, was also re-
jected. 140 The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had not placed the
Court's statement in MIS Bremen, that the serious inconvenience of the con-
tractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry greater weight in
determining the reasonableness of the forum clause, in proper context.
14 1
The MIS Bremen Court made this statement in evaluating a hypothetical
agreement between two Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes
in a remote alien forum. 14 2 The Shute Court noted that Florida was not a
remote alien forum nor, given the fact that Mrs. Shute's accident occurred
off the coast of Mexico, was the dispute essentially a local one inherently
better suited to resolution in Washington than in Florida. 14 3 In light of
these distinctions, and because the Shutes did not claim lack of notice of the
forum clause, the Shutes had not satisfied the heavy burden of proof required
to set aside the cause on grounds of inconvenience. 144
The Court also emphasized that the forum-selection clauses contained in
form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fair-
ness. 145 But, in Shute there was no indication that petitioners set Florida as
the forum in which disputes were to be resolved as a means of discouraging
cruise passengers from pursuing legitimate claims. Thus, by its plain lan-
guage, the forum-selection clause did not take away respondents' right to a
trial by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court located in Florida was
plainly a court of competent jurisdiction.
2. Texas Federal Courts
In Admiral Insurance Co. v. Brinkcraft Development, Ltd. 146 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior holding in Woods-Tucker
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1527.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1528.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
146. 921 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Leasing Corp. of Georgia v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co. 147 and applied Texas
law despite the fact that both contracts in issue in the case contained choice
of law provisions specifying Mississippi law as applicable. In Admiral Insur-
ance a payee's successor in interest sued the maker of a promissory note that
had been negotiated and executed in Texas. The defendant claimed that the
note's interest provision was usurious under Texas law. The choice of law
provision in the note specified that the note "is to be governed and controlled
'by the statutes, laws and decisions of the state in which the partnership, as
Payee of this instrument, maintains its Principal Place of Business' and that
the note was 'submitted to the Payee at its principal Place of Business and
shall be deemed to have been made thereat.' ",148 The initial payee listed a
principal place of business as New York. Admiral Insurance Company ac-
quired the note and brought suit against the defendant based upon the
default.
The district court found that the parties' choice-of-law provision was un-
enforceable under Texas law because the transaction bore no reasonable rela-
tion to New York. Under New York law there is no maximum interest rate
for notes over $250,000. Because the note was not usurious under New
York law, the central issue in the appeal was whether the note's New York
choice of law provision was enforceable under Texas law. Texas courts eval-
uate choice-of-law provisions by two separate standards, one for transactions
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and the other for transactions
governed by the Texas common law. 149 This case dealt with the former,
thus, the UCC choice-of-law provision applied. It stated that, "[e]xcept as
provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable re-
lation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree
that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties. Failing such agreement, this title applies to transac-
tions bearing an appropriate relation to this state."'150
The defendants argued that the note did not bear a reasonable relation to
New York, the note's contacts with New York were subterfuges designed to
evade Texas usury law, and the note's choice of law provision was unen-
forceable because it contravened Texas public policy. The Fifth Circuit
stated that all three arguments were foreclosed by its previous opinion in
Woods-Tucker. That case involved two contracts structured as a sale and
lease-back of farm equipment, but intended as a loan secured by the farm
equipment; both contracts contained Mississippi choice of law provisions.
The borrowers argued that the choice of law provisions were unenforceable,
and the interest provisions usurious, under Texas law. Texas clearly had the
most significant contacts with the transaction - the borrower was a Texas
partnership conducting business in Texas, the lender also conducted some
business in Texas, the borrower initiated the loan in Texas, and the farm
147. 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981).
148. Admiral Ins. Co., 921 F.2d at 592.
149. Uniwest Mortg. Co. v. Dadecor Condominiums, Inc., 877 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir.
1989).
150. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Vernon 1990).
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equipment was at all times located in Texas. In contrast, Mississippi's only
contacts with the transaction arose from the fact that the lender, a Georgia
corporation, maintained its principal offices in Mississippi, the parties finally
executed the loan in Mississippi, and the borrower initially made payments
in Mississippi. The court concluded, however, that Mississippi's contacts
were sufficient to constitute a reasonable relation to the transaction.
In reaching that conclusion, the Woods-Tucker court emphasized that the
UCC attempts to achieve uniformity in multi-state transactions through the
principle of party autonomy. Thus, parties to multi-state transactions may
include choice of law provisions in their contracts so long as the law chosen
bears some relation to the transaction. In describing the reasonable relation
test, the court had drawn substantially from Seeman v. Philadelphia Ware-
house Co., 5 involving a loan contract between a Pennsylvania lender and a
New York borrower that was usurious under New York law. The contract
contained no choice of law provision, but provided for repayment in Penn-
sylvania. The Supreme Court emphasized its policy of upholding contrac-
tual obligations assumed in good faith, and stated that the parties can
contract for the higher rate of interest when there is a disparity of interest
rates at the place of contract and the place of performance. The Court quali-
fied the rule, however, by noting that parties cannot willfully evade or avoid
the usury laws otherwise applicable by entering into the contract or stipulat-
ing for its performance at a place which has no normal relation to the trans-
action and to whose law they would not otherwise be subject. The Woods-
Tucker court relied on this point in concluding that the reasonable relation
test limited party autonomy only to the extent that it forbade parties from
choosing the law of a jurisdiction with no normal relation to the
transaction. 152
Thus, Woods-Tucker compelled the conclusion that New York law bore a
reasonable relation to the note held by Admiral. The note's original payee
was located in New York, and the note and the original payee's partnership
certificate both stated that New York was the principal place of business.
Finally, defendants made payments on the note at the original payee's offices
in New York, as expressly required by the note. The only factor in Texas'
favor was the fact that the note was actually negotiated and executed in
Texas. The court found the first three contacts sufficient to create a reason-
able relation to New York.
In Woods- Tucker the court also noted that applying Mississippi usury law
would not offend any fundamental Texas public policy.' 53 The court found
no Texas cases invalidating the choice of law provision on the ground that
applying the chosen state's usury law would violate Texas public policy, and
thus concluded that the absence of such holdings in Texas cases was a reflec-
tion that Texas seeks to balance the policy of national commercial uniform-
ity embodied in the UCC against the parochial self-defense embodied in the
151. 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
152. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga., 642 F.2d at 751.




Finally, the court noted that Woods- Tucker has not been undercut by any
subsequent Texas cases. Further, the appellate court distinguished the re-
cent decision in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp. where the Texas supreme
court held that a Florida choice of law provision in a non-competition agree-
ment was not enforceable under Texas law because Texas had a greater in-
terest in the transaction than Florida, and the agreement violated Texas
public policy. 155 The appellate court pointed out that DeSantis was decided
under common law principles, not the UCC, and non-competition agree-
ments implicate an arguably stronger Texas public policy than usurious
contracts. 156
In Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Griffin 157 a savings and loan
association filed suit against the guarantor in a state court to recover a defi-
ciency due on a promissory note. The case was removed by the FSLIC as
receiver. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas ruled that the guarantor was liable under a guaranty in spite of
claimed defenses, and the guarantor appealed.
After an unsuccessful attempt to make money in Dallas real estate, Griffin
approached First Texas Savings Association about the possibility of a loan
for a joint venture. First Texas agreed to fund the first phase and made a
loan for the joint venture. Like many businesses in Texas real estate, the
joint venture fell upon hard times. First Texas added to the joint venture's
troubles by refusing to exercise its option to supply construction financing.
The joint venture subsequently failed to fulfill its obligation under the note.
In an effort to escape liability under the guaranty, Griffin asserted the affirm-
ative defenses of breach of partnership duties, usury, wrongful foreclosure of
property, and breach of agreement to fund. However, First Gibraltar as-
serted that the defenses were barred by the doctrine established in D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp..158 That doctrine protects
the FDIC and the FSLIC from unrecorded side agreements not reflected in
the bank's records.' 59 The district court held that Griffin was liable under
the guaranty in spite of his claimed defenses.
Griffin strenuously urged that the choice of law provisions in the contract
between him and the bank precluded application of D'Oench, Duhme. The
loan documents provided that Texas law would apply, and the choice-of-law
provisions would be enforceable under Texas law. Nevertheless, the court
found that federal law applied in the case. 160 The choice of law provision in
the guaranty addressed which state law applies when state law governs a
case. The assertion of controlling federal law overpowers a contract provi-
154. Id.
155. 793 S.W.2d at 670.
156. Admiral Ins. Co., 921 F.2d at 594.
157. 935 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1991).
158. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 461.
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sion which addresses only which state law to apply when a state's law will
provide the rule of decision.
The case of Albany Insurance Co. v. Kieu 161 addressed the application of
choice of law principles to maritime insurance disputes. Kieu secured
marine hull insurance for her shrimp vessel from Albany. Although the ap-
plication contained inaccurate statements, Albany continued to receive pre-
miums from Kieu, and to extend coverage on the vessel. In 1988, the vessel
was involved in a collision, causing major damage to the vessel's hull. Inves-
tigators surveyed the damage and recommended that Albany deny any lia-
bility under the policy. Subsequently, Albany filed a declaratory judgment
action in federal district court requesting a declaration of Kieu's rights on
the policy. The court declared that under Texas law Kieu should recover
the insured value of her vessel minus the salvage value of the vessel's hull.
On appeal, Albany attacked the district court's application of Texas insur-
ance law, arguing that the district court should have instead applied the fed-
eral law of uberrimae fidei,162 or in the alternative that the district court
should have applied Louisiana insurance law. The appellate court noted
that maritime commerce traverses the waters of many states; a set of facts in
a maritime case could conceivably implicate the laws of several states, as
well as the federal laws of the United States. Therefore, in determining the
applicable law, a court must first consider whether federal maritime law is
preeminent, and then often must also consider whether one state's law is
applicable over another state's law. 163 Although the courts typically rely
upon federal common law to resolve maritime disputes, state law occasion-
ally can be used to supplement or even supersede maritime law. 164
In Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 165 the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the regulation of marine insurance is, in most
instances, properly left with the states. Following this direction, the Fifth
Circuit has ruled that the interpretation of a contract of marine insurance is,
in the absence of a specific and controlling federal rule, to be determined by
reference to appropriate state law. 166 The Fifth Circuit "has identified three
factors that a court should consider in determining if a federal maritime rule
controls the disputed issue: (1) whether the federal maritime rule constitutes
'an entrenched federal precedent'; (2) whether the state has a substantial
and legitimate interest in the application of its law; and (3) whether the
state's rule is materially different from the federal maritime rule."' 167 The
161. 927 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1991).
162. This law invalidates marine insurance contracts on evidence of the assured's material
misrepresentations to the underwriter. Id. at 886.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1986).
165. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
166. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 771 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir.
1985).
167. Kieu, 927 F.2d, at 886. See also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wilburn Boat Co., 300
F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925 (1962); Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica
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court noted, however, that the factors are merely instructive and not
dispositive.
After concluding that federal maritime law did not govern the assured's
right to payment on the marine insurance policy, the court next determined
whether Texas or Louisiana insurance law should apply. Albany argued
that, even if federal maritime law did not apply, the district court should
have applied a similarly strict Louisiana law. Although a federal court gen-
erally applies the choice of law rules of the forum in which it is located, 168
the court in maritime cases must apply general federal maritime choice of
law rules. 169 Thus, the court concluded that it was bound to consider the
choice-of-law rules which specifically govern marine insurance disputes.
This, however, did not prove to be an easy process for the court, as prior
Fifth Circuit decisions attempting to explain the proper choice of state insur-
ance law governing the interpretation of marine insurance policies were con-
flicting. 170 Attempting to apply the various holdings to the facts of Kieu was
somewhat difficult, as the contract was countersigned and therefore likely
formed in Louisiana, it was issued in Louisiana but delivered in Texas, and
Texas appeared to have the greatest interest in the application of its law.
Nevertheless, the court reconciled the inconsistent choice-of-law rules by
noting that modern choice of law analysis, whether maritime or not, gener-
ally requires the application of the law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the substantive issue in question. 171 In contract cases courts
must consider such factors as the place of the formation of the contract and
the place of negotiation of the contract to determine which states have suffi-
cient contact with the transaction and the parties to support the application
of their law. 172 However, the court noted that the application of the most
significant relationship approach did not simply turn on the number of con-
tacts each state had with the controversy. 173 The most significant relation-
ship test, instead, examines the relative interests of all of the states which
share a sufficient relationship with the transaction and the parties. 174
Thus, the court concluded that both the options of requiring the applica-
tion of the law of the state in which the policy formed or the law of the state
in which the policy was issued and delivered, identify only the states which
have sufficient contact with the policy and the parties that their laws can be
Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 1980); Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Valentine, 431 F.2d
1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1970).
168. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
169. Kieu, 927 F.2d at 890; Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 880 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1970).
170. Compare Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 811 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1987) (law of
the state in which the insurance contract was formed determines the parties' rights) with Ele-
vating Boats, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Marine, Inc., 766 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1985) (law of the
state where the marine insurance contract was issued and delivered is the governing law) and
Truehart v. Blandon, 884 F.2d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1989) (in identifying the appropriate state
law to apply, look to the state having the greatest interest in the resolution of the issues).
171. Kieu, 927 F.2d at 891. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1980).
172. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1990).
173. Kieu, 927 F.2d at 891.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1980).
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applied. 75 Requiring the application of the law of the state with the greatest
interest, however, identifies the state law that should be applied. A federal
court in a marine insurance dispute must apply the first two rules to isolate
the eligible states, and then must determine which state has the greatest in-
terest in the resolution of the issues. 176
A review of the first two choice of law rules indicated that both Texas and
Louisiana had sufficient contact with the marine insurance policy and the
parties to support the application of their laws. However, Texas had a con-
siderably greater interest in the application of its insurance code, as it has a
strong interest in the protection of its citizens, including Kieu, against the
overbearing tactics of insurance underwriters.1 77 Louisiana's interest in the
protection of citizens of foreign states was less significant. Thus, the appel-
late court determined that the district court properly applied the insurance
laws of Texas.
3. Texas State Courts
At issue in Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Brothers,178 was the enforce-
ability of an indemnity clause in a contract between two companies, each
with its principal place of business in Texas. Moran Brothers agreed to drill
an oil well in Kansas for Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., now Maxus
Exploration Co. Moran, a Texas corporation, and Diamond Shamrock, a
Delaware corporation, negotiated the contract in Texas where each has its
principal place of business. Diamond and Moran each agreed to indemnify
the other against bodily injury claims by its own employees and its contrac-
tors' employees, even if caused by the other's negligence. Each also agreed
to support its indemnity obligation by purchasing liability insurance or to be
self insured. Moran chose to self insure its risk. Diamond Shamrock was
not required to obtain a specific amount of liability insurance, but it had
policies covering 70% of each bodily injury claim over $1 million, up to $6
million.
The contract was executed and the well drilled in 1980. During the drill-
ing operation an employee of one of Diamond Shamrock's contractors was
injured on Moran's rig. The employee, an Oklahoma resident whose em-
ployer was also located in Oklahoma, sued Moran in the United States Dis-
trict Court in Kansas. Moran filed a cross-action against Diamond
Shamrock for indemnity under the drilling contract. Diamond Shamrock
undertook to defend Moran in the litigation, each reserving any right it
might have to seek indemnity or other damages from the other. Based upon
a jury verdict that the employee had suffered $3 million in damages caused
90% by Moran's negligence, the court rendered judgment against Moran for
$2.7 million. Moran then settled with the employee. Diamond Shamrock
and its insurer paid approximately half the settlement amount and Moran
175. Kieu, 927 F.2d at 891.
176. Id.; Truehart, 884 F.2d at 226.
177. Kieu, 927 F.2d at 891.
178. 817 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1991).
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paid the balance. Diamond Shamrock and Moran continued to reserve their
indemnity claims against one another.
Diamond Shamrock then brought an action against Moran to determine
the validity of the indemnity provisions of the agreement. Diamond Sham-
rock contended that these provisions were governed by Texas law, and that
what is now chapter 127 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, gov-
erning indemnity provisions in certain mineral agreements, voids or at least
limits, the obligation to indemnify Moran. Alternatively, Diamond Sham-
rock argued that the provisions were unenforceable under Kansas law. Kan-
sas has no statue governing indemnity agreements, but requires generally a
clear and unequivocal expression of intent to indemnify a party against its
own negligence, and Diamond Shamrock argues that the provisions in its
contract did not meet this requirement. Diamond Shamrock sought reim-
bursement from Moran for most or all of what it paid to the employee, plus
its litigation costs for defending Moran. Moran contended that the indem-
nity provisions were valid under both Kansas and Texas law, and sought
reimbursement for the amount it paid to the employee.
Diamond Shamrock and Moran both moved for summary judgment. The
trial court denied Diamond Shamrock's motion for summary judgment, and
granted Moran's, upholding the indemnity provision. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding the indemnity agreement valid under Texas law.
The Texas supreme court first considered whether the indemnity provi-
sions of the drilling contract were governed by Texas or Kansas law. In
deciding which state's law should have governed the construction of con-
tractual rights, the court had previously looked to the principles stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). 179 The court then applied
these principles to Maxus.
When the parties to a contract have not themselves chosen the laws to
govern the agreement, section 188(1) of the Restatement states the general
rule: "[T]he rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in con-
tract were determined by the local law of the state that had the most signifi-
cant relationship to the transaction" and the parties and to the principals
stated in section 6.180 Section 188(2) lists the context comprising the rela-
tionship between transaction and locale ordinarily to be taken into account
in applying the principals in section 6. These include "(a) the place of con-
tracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of per-
formance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties."""' The court agreed that the general rule in section 188 con-
trols the choice of law governing contractual rights and duties, and that
these include indemnity agreements. 18 2
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 173, 177-78 (1991); DeSan-
tis, 793 S.W.2d at 679, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1991); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1991).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1991).
182. Maxus Exploration, 817 S.W.2d at 53.
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With respect to certain specific transactions, the restatement indicates
how the contacts listed in section 188(2) should be evaluated. In the case of
a contract for rendition of services, section 186 accords the place of perform-
ance paramount importance.18 3 The several virtues of this rule when appli-
cable are explained in comment c to section 196.184
In Maxus nearly all the services were contemplated by the parties to be
rendered and were actually rendered in Kansas where the well was drilled.
Taken as a whole, the contract was performable almost entirely in Kansas.
"As a rule, that factor alone is conclusive in determining what state's laws is
to apply."185 The court noted, however, that in some instances it is more
appropriate to consider the disputed contractual issues separately from the
contract as a whole. 18 6 Even assuming that the indemnity obligations and
the agreements should be considered separately, they were also performable,
at least for the most part, in Kansas, where Diamond Shamrock, pursuant to
those obligations while reserving the issue of the validity, defended Moran
and the employee's litigation. Following section 196 of the restatement, the
court concluded that Kansas law should be applied to determine the party's
rights under their contract unless, with respect to the validity of the indem-
nity provisions, some other state has a more significant relationship to the
parties and their transaction under the principles in section 6 of the
Restatement. 187
183. Id. at 679. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 states:
The validity of a contract for the rendition of services and the rights created
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the par-
ties, by the local law of the state where the contract requires that the services, or
a major portion of the services, be rendered, unless, with respect to the particu-
lar issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the princi-
ples stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law
of the other state will be applied.
See also Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. 1967) (contract which is made in one
jurisdiction but which relates to and is found to be performed in another jurisdiction is gov-
erned by the law of the place of performance); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429
F.2d 1033, 1048 (5th Cir. 1970) (interpretation of contracts executed in Texas but to be per-
formed wholly outside the state is governed by the law of the place of performance).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196, comment c states:
The rendition of services is the principal objective of the contract, the place
where the services, or major portion of the services, are to be rendered will natu-
rally loom large in the minds of the parties. Indeed, it can often be assumed that
the parties, to the extent that they thought about the matter at all, would expect
that the local law of the state where the services, or a major portion of the
services, are to be rendered would be applied to determine many of the issues
under the contract. The state where the services are to be rendered will also
have a natural interest in them .... The rule of this section also furthers the
choice-of-law values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and,
since the place where the contract requires that the services, or a major portion
of the services, are to be rendered will be readily ascertainable, of ease in the
determination of the applicable law.
185. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 679.
186. Maxus Exploration, 817 S.W.2d at 54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS, Title C, Particular Issues at 631-32 (1991). Although most issues involving a con-
tract will usually be governed by single law, "occasionally" an approach directed to the partic-
ular issue, rather than to the kind of contract involved, will provide a more helpful basis for
the decision of a choice-of-law question.
187. Maxus Exploration, 817 S.W.2d at 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
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Before the court could evaluate these factors, it had to first examine the
differences between Texas and Kansas law. The parties raised two principal
differences pertaining to the enforceability of indemnity provisions: One dif-
ference is that Texas has a statute governing indemnity provisions and cer-
tain mineral agreements and Kansas does not. The second difference is that
Texas requires that an agreement to indemnify another for his own negli-
gence must be express, 188 while Kansas law requires that the agreement be
clear and unequivocal.' 8 9 The court found that the indemnity agreement
between the two parties met the unequivocal standard of Kansas law, as well
as the requirement of Texas law that the indemnity agreement be express.
Thus, while the degree of certainty to which indemnity provisions are sub-
ject differs under Texas and Kansas law, they meet the standards imposed by
both jurisdictions. The only effective difference between the two states' law
remaining was the existence of arstatute expressing public policy in Texas, in
the absence of any such statute or policy in Kansas. With this difference in
mind, the court addressed the principles of section 6 of the Restatement.
Of the seven choice of law principles in section 6, the court found that
four militated in favor of applying Kansas law in this case: the protection of
justified expectations; certainty, predictability and uniformity of results; eas-
ing the determination and application of the law to be applied; and the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law. The latter pointed to the gen-
eral choice-of-law rule for contracts. 19° The other three (identified by the
Restatement) supported the rule favoring application of the law of the place
of the performance of contracts for the rendition of services generally.' 9'
Although the parties did not expressly provide for the law which would gov-
ern their agreement, they should have expected that Kansas law would at
least be invoked. Kansas law was in fact applied in the employee's personal
injury action. Although a state may have an interest in applying its law to a
particular issue arising under the contract, in circumstances like these it is
less desirable that Kansas law govern the employee's action and Texas law
govern the defendant's cross claims than it is that the same law govern both.
Had Diamond Shamrock and Moran not agreed to reserve their indemnity
claims, the federal court in Kansas would have been required to determine
them in the employee's litigation.
One section 6 principle, that these are the interstate and international sys-
LAWS § 6 (1980). Section 6 provides when there is no statutory directive concerning the law
to be applied in the case,
the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the
needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the
forum, (c) the relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative
interest of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the pro-
tection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law, (0 certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied.
188. Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2, 8 (Tex. 1990).
189. Bartlett v. Davis Corp., 219 Kan. 148, 547 P.2d 800, 807-10 (1976).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 173(b), 188 (1990).
191. Id. § 196(c).
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tems, was not implicated much, if at all in this case. The parties had not
identified any such needs pertaining to the issue in the case and the court
was not aware of any. The two remaining principles to be considered - the
relevant policies of Texas and Kansas, and the relative interest of each in
determining the validity of indemnity agreements - did not determine the
issue in the case. Texas had formulated a clear statutory policy pertaining to
indemnity agreements. Kansas had no such policy. Arguably, the Texas
legislature's purpose in enacting chapter 127 was to protect Texas contrac-
tors who work on mineral wells and mines wherever they may be situated;
however, the court found it more plausible that the legislature had the more
limited objective in mind of protecting contractors who drill wells in Texas.
The court did not read the statute to have an extra territorial reach, as in
some agreements between parties.192 In deciding which state's law would
govern an agreement like the one in this case, all relevant factors, including
those set out in section 6 of the Restatement, had to be evaluated. On bal-
ance, those factors required the application of Kansas law in the case.
B. Choice of Law in Tort Actions
1. Texas Federal Courts
In Knight v. Department of Army 193 Knight brought a medical malprac-
tice action against physicians after contracting the HIV virus through blood
transfusions given during heart surgery. Partial summary judgment was
granted in favor of the defendant; however, the court was left to decide the
issue of informed consent.
Although the parties agreed that the damage issue should be determined
under Alabama law, the parties disagreed as to whether Texas or Alabama
law should govern the liability issues. The court noted that in a Federal Tort
Claims Act case, recovery is based on the law of the state where the alleged
negligent act or omission occurred. This includes the choice of law of the
state. Texas choice-of-law applies the most significant relationship test, the
general principles of which are set out in section 6 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. 194
The court was charged with identifying those qualitative factors relevant
to the choice of the applicable rule of law. It noted that the evidence clearly
established that the surgery and the acts or omissions to the informed con-
sent issue occurred in Texas. Moreover, although the plaintiff was a resident
of Alabama, he chose to come to Texas for his surgery. He could have rea-
sonably expected that Army physicians performing surgery in Texas would
be governed by Texas law. Conversely he could have had no such reason-
able expectations that the same physicians would be governed by Alabama
law. Finally, the transmission of the HIV virus into plaintiff occurred in
Texas, although his death occurred in Alabama.
192. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.002(a) (Vernon 1986).
193. 757 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1980).
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Although Alabama has an interest in seeing that its residents are fully
compensated for their damages, Alabama has no interest in having physi-
cians in Texas comply with Alabama medical standards. In contrast, Texas
has a direct and important interest in seeing that the surgeons practicing in
Texas comply with reasonable standards of their profession in this state.
Furthermore, plaintiff conceded that both Alabama and Texas law apply the
same objective standard in determining informed consent and would reach
the same results. Accordingly, applying Texas choice-of-law principals, the
court determined that Texas law applied to the liability issues.
An injured serviceman and the survivors of other servicemen killed in an
explosion of a mortar shell led to a products liability action against the man-
ufacturers of the shell in Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc.195 The
manufacturers of the shell alleged that North Carolina law governed the
lawsuit and barred the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiffs, however, urged that
Texas law should apply in the action. The district court applied Texas law.
On appeal of an adverse verdict, both defendants claimed that the district
court erred in applying Texas law, and should have applied the more re-
stricted North Carolina law. The North Carolina statute of repose provides
that no action for personal injuries resulting from a defective product shall
be brought more than six years after the date of the initial purchase for use
or consumption. Texas law contains no comparable provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that in a diversity action
in federal court, the district court is required to follow the choice of law
rules of the state in which it sits. 196 Texas has adopted the most significant
relationship approach detailed in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. Under this approach, in all choice of law cases,
except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice
of law clause, the law of the state with the most significant relationship to
the particular substantive issue will be applied to resolve that issue.
In applying the most significant relationship test, the court must first iden-
tify the relevant state contacts. The court in this case found that although
the premature explosion of the mortar shell occurred in North Carolina, the
defective shell was completed in Texas and placed into the stream of com-
merce in Texas.
According to the court, it is not sufficient merely to isolate the state with
the greatest number of contacts. The application of the most significant rela-
tionship approach to the resolution of the choice of law questions does not
turn on the number of contacts, but more importantly on the qualitative
nature of those contacts as affected by the policy factors enumerated in sec-
tion 6 of the Restatement. 197 After identifying the states with the relevant
contacts the court must identify the policies or governmental interests of
each state in the controversy in question. In this case the only states with
195. 913 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1990).
196. Id. at 245. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 487.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6 (1980).
1502 [Vol. 45
CONFLICT OF LAWS
interests asserted were those of Texas and North Carolina. Thus, the court
considered only the interests of these two states.
The court noted that North Carolina's statute of repose was enacted to
shield North Carolina manufacturers from open-ended liability that might
exist for an indefinite period of time after a product is sold and distributed.
However, in this case there was no North Carolina manufacturer involved as
a defendant. Therefore, the court found no compelling reason why the
North Carolina legislature would have an interest in the application of its
statute of repose to eliminate the claims of foreign plaintiffs against foreign
defendants.
Texas, on the other hand, had a substantial interest in the resolution of the
parties' claims and defenses. The Texas legislature and courts have devel-
oped an almost paternalistic interest in the protection of consumers in the
regulation of the conduct of manufacturers that have business operations in
the state. The expansive Texas system of tort liability for defective products
serves as an incentive to encourage safer design and to induce corporations
to control more carefully their manufacturing processes. 98 This interest is
particularly strong when the defective product in question was manufac-
tured and placed into the stream of commerce in Texas. Therefore, upon
review of the respective interests of the states of North Carolina and Texas,
Texas had the greater interest in the parties' claims and defenses. Under the
most significant relationship tests, Texas law was properly applied.
In Fogelman v. Aramco 199 a worker who was injured on a platform off the
shore of Saudi Arabia brought a personal injury suit against the employer, a
Saudi Arabian subsidiary of a United States corporation, and against the
platform owner, a United States corporation based in Saudi Arabia. The
district court had decided that Saudi Arabian law applied in the suit for
personal injury sustained by Fogelman. The appellate court reviewed de
novo the district court's choice of law determination, and determined that
whether federal maritime law or forum law should govern a maritime tort
depends on an assessment of eight factors articulated by the Supreme Court
in Lauritzen v. Larsen.200 The factors included the place of the wrongful act,
the law of the flag, the allegiance or domicile of the injured worker, the
allegiance of the defendant ship owner, the place of the contract, the inacces-
sibility of foreign forum, the law of the forum, and ship owners base of oper-
ations. The court noted that the test is not a mechanical one in which a
court simply counts a relevant context; instead, the significance of each fac-
tor must be considered within the particular context of the claim and na-
tional interest that might be served by the application of United States law,
particularly the Jones Act.20
The court addressed each factor in light of the facts of the case, and found
that the only significant factor that pointed to the application of United
198. Mitchell, 913 F.2d at 250.
199. 920 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1991).
200. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
201. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
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States law was the domicile of the plaintiff. Courts have previously held that
the allegiance of a plaintiff, even when recruited in the United States, did not
mandate the application of United States law in a maritime suit when all
other factors indicate the application of foreign law. The plaintiffs also con-
tended that the remedy available to them under Saudi Arabian law was inad-
equate on its face and that the application of United States law to the suit
was therefore required. The fact that the law of another forum may be more
or less favorable to the plaintiff, however, does not determine the choice of
law.20 2 Moreover, the court had previously mandated the application of the
labor law of Saudi Arabia to proceedings in the United States. Therefore,
the appellate court did not disturb the district court's ruling regarding
choice of law.
Finally, in Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co. 203 Pruitt filed an action challenging
the termination of his employment with a division of Levi Strauss & Co.
Pruitt alleged that Levi Strauss fraudulently induced him to leave his former
employment, breached oral and written contracts of employment, and
breached a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court
granted Levi Strauss summary judgment on all claims.
Pruitt argued that the district court erroneously failed to apply California
employment law to resolve the dispute between the parties. California law
imposes on employers a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.204 On the
other hand, Texas law, the only alternative asserted by Levi Strauss, does
not recognize the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
relationship. 205
In a diversity action in federal court, the district is required to follow the
choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.2° 6 Texas has adopted the
"most significant relationship" approach to the choice of law, as detailed in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.207 Under this approach, "in
all choice of law cases, except those contract cases in which the parties have
agreed to a valid choice-of-law clause, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be applied to
resolve that issue."'20 8
In cases involving contracts for the rendition of services, the Texas
supreme court has usually relied upon section 196 of the Restatement. 2°9 As
a general rule, the place in which the services are performed is controlling in
202. Fogelman, 920 F.2d at 284. See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
203. 932 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1991).
204. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980).
205. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
206. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
207. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 678.
208. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421.
209. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 679. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 196 requires the application of the law of the state in which major portions of the contractual
services were performed unless a different state has a more significant relationship to the trans-
action and the parties.
1504 [Vol. 45
CONFLICT OF LAWS
determining what state's laws to apply. 2 10 In Pruitt the majority of the em-
ployment obligations were performed in the state of Texas.
The appellate court could not discern any state which had a more signifi-
cant relationship to the transaction of the parties than the state of Texas.
Therefore a determination of the most significant relationship test did not
turn on the number of contacts, but on the quality of those contacts, as
affected by the policy factors enumerated in Section 6 of the Restatement. 211
Texas had a compelling interest in the application of its employment law to
its own residents and employment activities that occurred within its bor-
ders.21 2 Other states, including California, might have similar interests in
the application of their respective employment laws, but these interests are
much more attenuated when the aggrieved party is an out of state resident
who suffered an out of state injury. 2 13 Thus under the guidelines of section
196 of the Restatement, the appellate court determined that the district
court had properly applied Texas law.
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
There are generally two ways in which foreign judgments create conflicts
of laws: the local enforcement of foreign judgments, and the preclusive effect
of foreign lawsuits on local lawsuits. One topic potentially impacting these
areas is that of the "anti-suit" injunction, which has become popular since
the Texas supreme court's decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro.2 14 That
decision appeared to open the door to allow foreign litigants to pursue their
cases in Texas state courts regardless of where the accident occurred. 21 5
Thus, a Texas court could hear a case, no matter how remote the contacts
with Texas, so long as the requirements for the exercise of in personam juris-
diction are met, and the case is not removable. The anti-suit injunction is a
remedy by which a defendant may extricate himself from this situation. An
anti-suit injunction enjoins a foreign plaintiff in his home jurisdiction from
pursuing his action in Texas.
The test to be followed in determining whether to grant an anti-suit in-
junction is set forth in SNI Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak.2 16 Courts must first
determine whether the foreign jurisdiction is the natural forum, and second,
that justice does not require that the action proceed in Texas court. In deter-
mining the natural forum, courts are to consider the relationship between
each of the forums and the parties, their transactions, the witnesses, and the
evidence. The second requirement, that justice be served, restricts anti-suit
210. Id.
211. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. 1979).
212. Garcia v. Total Oilfield Serv., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), per curiam, 711 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1986).
213. Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 155 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
214. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
215. W. Carter, Jr., Anti-Suit Injunctions: Enjoining Foreign Plaintiffs From Pursuing
Their Actions In Texas, TEX. Assoc. OF DEFENSE COUNSEL MANUAL (section entitled "In-
junctions") 1-8 (1991).
216. 3 All ER 510 (1987).
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injunctions to those situations where the foreign proceedings are "vexatious
or oppressive. ' 21 7
The anti-suit injunction gained further recognition in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Board,218 where two-hundred Canadian
plaintiffs sued thirty American asbestos producers for work-related injuries
occurring in British Columbia. The defendants commenced injunction pro-
ceedings in the British Columbia court to enjoin the suit proceeding in
Texas. The Canadian court based its discussion primarily on the holding of
Aerospatiale in determining that the overwhelming number of ties to British
Columbia and almost non-existent Texas connections made British Colum-
bia an easy choice as the natural forum. Because the effect of Alfaro21 9 was
essentially to strip Texas courts of the power to consider pleas of forum non
conveniens, the Amchem court determined that the defendants would be op-
pressed if the Texas action were allowed. Thus, the court decided to enjoin
the Texas action. 220
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 221 which was dismissed by the Texas
supreme court on October 16, 1991, for want of jurisdiction, also addressed
the issues of the appropriateness of an anti-suit injunction and deciding
whether comity should be invoked. Owens-Illinois appealed from a tempo-
rary injunction obtained by Webb in order to prevent Owens-Illinois from
pursuing an injunction in Canadian court. The single question presented for
review was whether the district court abused its discretion by enjoining the
appellants from pursuing an injunction in a foreign court which could pro-
hibit the appellees from pursuing their Texas action. In short, the court was
dealing with an anti-suit proceeding.
The underlying personal injury asbestos suit was filed in district court in
Texas in 1988. The plaintiffs were 216 Canadian citizens. The defendants
were numerous corporate manufacturers and distributors of asbestos prod-
ucts. All damages were alleged to have occurred in Canada.
In 1989, the Texas defendants began a proceeding in trial court in British
Columbia seeking to enjoin the ninety-eight British Columbian plaintiffs in
the Texas action from pursuing the personal injury claims in a Texas court.
The Canadian trial court granted the injunction in December of 1989 and
the British Columbia court of appeals affirmed this action as to all ninety-
eight British Columbian plaintiffs by written opinion in November of
1990.222
During this time appellees' counsel obtained a temporary restraining or-
der from the Texas district court restraining the appellants from seeking
217. Carter, Jr., supra note 215, at 5.
218. No. CAO 11728 (Vancouver Court of Appeal, Nov. 5, 1990).
219. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 674.
220. Amchem, No. CAO 11728 (Vancouver Court of Appeal, Nov. 5, 1990). The Amchem
court did not address the question of whether comity would require accordance with the deci-
sion of the Texas court if it was based upon an adjudication on the merit of a plea of forum non
conveniens.
221. 809 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
222. Id. at 900.
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similar injunctions in other Canadian provinces. Immediately after the ren-
dition of an opinion by British Columbia trial court in December of 1989,
the plaintiffs' counsel withdrew his application for an injunction in the Texas
court, and agreed to abate the Texas trial court proceeding pending final
resolution of the British Columbia appeal.
On the date that the British Columbia court of appeals rendered judgment
against prosecution of the claims, the plaintiffs' counsel obtained an ex parte
temporary restraining order from the Texas district court. The order pre-
vented appellants from seeking similar injunctions in the Canadian courts in
the provinces in which the remaining parties resided. After a hearing in
November of 1990, the Texas court granted the temporary injunction
prohibiting the appellants from bringing an action in Canada to enjoin the
appellees from proceeding with the Texas action. Appellants appealed.
The appellate court specifically noted that this was not a case concerning
jurisdiction, as both Canadian courts and Texas courts would have jurisdic-
tion of the underlying suits. As the case involved two sovereigns with con-
current jurisdiction to decide the controversy, the principle of comity
required that the trial court exercise its equitable power sparingly and only
in special circumstances. 223 Comity in the legal sense, the court noted, is
neither a matter of absolute obligation, nor a matter of mere courtesy
and good will. It is, however, the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.224
In Gannon v. Payne the Texas supreme court had held that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting an anti-suit injunction involving the two
sovereigns, Texas and Canada.225 There are no precise guidelines for deter-
mining the appropriateness of an anti-suit injunction or for deciding whether
comity should be invoked. Under Gannon the circumstances of each situa-
tion must be carefully examined to determine whether the injunction is re-
quired to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice. 226  "Anti-suit
injunctions have been issued by courts (1) to protect their own jurisdiction,
(2) to prevent evasion of important public policies of the forum nation,
(3) to prevent a multiplicity of suits, or (4) to protect a party from vexation
or harassing litigation. '227
223. Id. at 901. (citing Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1986).
224. Id. (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894).
225. 706 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1986). The facts in Owens-Illinois differ in two significant as-
pects from the facts in Gannon: (1) In the Gannon case, the trial court had enjoined a Cana-
dian citizen from bringing an action in Canada. In Owens-Illinois, the trial court enjoined
Texas resident corporations from bringing a suit in Canada to enjoin Canadian citizens from
bringing their action in Texas; (2) In Gannon, the matter had already been litigated in Canada,
and the Canadian citizen was asking for a declaratory judgment based upon the prior judg-
ment. In Owens-Illinois, not only had the matter not been litigated in Canada, there was no
parallel suit pending, nor was there any pending litigation at any stage of the proceeding in
Canada on the substance of the litigation.
226. Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307.
227. Owens-Illinois, 809 S.W.2d at 902.
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The appellate court stated that the Texas trial court most likely granted
the injunction for the purpose of protecting its own jurisdiction. 228 A Texas
court can enjoin its residents, either corporate or individual, over which it
has jurisdiction, from proceeding with litigation in another forum. Thus, the
appellate court did not find an abuse of discretion on the part of the Texas
trial court.
228. Id. If the appellants were allowed to enjoin the appellees in a Canadian action from
further proceedings, the Texas court would lose its ability to proceed with the case.
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